view is that the current global warming rate will continue or accelerate. But we argue that rapid warming in recent decades has been driven mainly by non-COz greenhouse gases (GHGs), such as chlorofluorocarbons, CH4, and N20, not by the products of fossil fuel burning, CO2 and aerosols, the positive and negative climate forcings of which are partially offsetting. The growth rate of non-CO2 GHGs has declined in the past decade, if sources of CH4 and 03 precursors were reduced in the future, the change in climate forcing by non-CO2 GHGs in the next 50 years could be near zero. Combined with a reduction of black carbon emissions and plausible success in slowing COl emissions, this reduction of non-CO2 GHGs could lead to a decline in the rate of global warming, reducing the danger of dramatic climate change. Such a focus on air pollution has practical benefits that unite the interests of developed and developing countries. However, assessment of ongoing and future climate change requires compositionspecific long-term global monitoring of aerosol properties.
emissions and plausible success in slowing COl emissions, this reduction of non-CO2 GHGs could lead to a decline in the rate of global warming, reducing the danger of dramatic climate change. Such a focus on air pollution has practical benefits that unite the interests of developed and developing countries. However, assessment of ongoing and future climate change requires compositionspecific long-term global monitoring of aerosol properties. (14) , is itself considered a difficult target to achieve.
Yet the cJimate simulations lead to the conclusion that the Kyoto reductions will have little effect in the twenty-first century (15), and "'30 Kyotos" may be needed to reduce warming to an acceptable level (16 
Consistency Checks. Two empirical pieces of information are consistent with our estimated net climate forcing:
Of the past century and (it) observed heat storage in the ocean.
The second of these is direct and fundamental.
Paleoclimate data (13, 32, 33) imply that the equilibrium global climate sensitivity for doubled CO2 (a forcing of about 4 W,/m 2) is 3 -+ I°C (thus 3/4 + !/4°C per W/m-").
This figure is similar to the sensitivity derived from climate models (4, [2), but it has a higher precision and confidence level. This climate sensitivity implies a thermal response time of the ocean surface of 50-100 years (32, 34 AtmosphericCO2 and CH4observationsand rangeof IS92scenarios(the solidred line is 1592a).
GHGs, inch,,ling CFCs, was already a 15% reduction from the principal 19011IPCC scenario (38) . The observed increase in CH 4 in the 1990s h,lls below the lowest IS92 scenario, whereas CO: falls on the hlwest lS92 scenario.
Trends of Ihe climate forcings are revealed better by their annual grow +h rates, as shown in Fig. 3 for anthropogenic GHGs. The forcing._ ,, e calculated from the equations of Carbon Dioxl,lu. The growth rate of forcing by CO2 doubled between the 1'150._and the 1970s (Fig. 3A) but was flat from the late 1970s tlldtl fl)c late 1990s, despite a 30% increase in fossil fuel use (30_ Ihis finding implies a recent increase in terrestrial i and/or occ_,lic sinks for CO,_, which may be temporary. The largest annuill increase of CO:, 2.7 ppm, occurred in 1998. The annual incr¢,c,c was 2.1 ppm in 1999, although the growth rate had decream'd m 1.3 ppm/year by the end of the year.
Methane. A ,ll.mmtic growth rate change has occurred for CH4 (Fig. 3B) . +1 hc ,,nlall interannual variability of CH+ before 1982 reflects sm,,,,ihing inherent in ice core data (37) . Factors that may have _ho,'vcd the CH4 growth rate are recognized, as discussed bch _w,I_ut most of them are not accurately quantified.
CFCs. The g,,,_ 11 rate of the two principal CFCs is near zero (Fig.  3C ) and will Iw negative in the future as a result of production restrictions IiiIposcd by the Montreal Protocol (40). Other CFCs together c;m_c ;1 climate forcing that may approach that of CFC-12 e;ulv m the twenty-first century (4, 41) . But most of these arc I,,mg phased out, and, assuming compliance with production agreements (42), the net change in CFC climate forcing in the next 50 years will be small, as discussed below.
The Three Largest Climate Forcings
The largest anthropogenic climate forcings, by CO:, CH4 and aerosols ( Fig. 1) , pose the greatest uncertainties in attempts to project future climate change.
Carbon Dioxide. Coal and oil are now about equal sources of CO2 emissions (Fig. 4) . Coal is the source of potentially large future emissions, as its known resources are an order of magnitude greater than those of either oil or gas (43) . Coal use has declined in much of the world, but it has been increasing in the United States and China (39, 43) .
The increase in atmospheric CO_+ in recent decades (Fig. 2 ) represents about half of the emissions from fossil fuels and changes in tropical land use; the remaining CO+.. from these sources is taken up by the ocean, terrestrial biosphere, and soils. The flat growth rate of CO_-forcing, despite increased emissions, is at least in part a reflection of increased terrestrial sequestration of carbon in the 1990s (44) . The slowing growth rate of emissions may itself allow a higher proportion of CO: emissions to be sequestered. Thus the prognosis for future sequestration is uncertain, but maintenance of a flat growth rate of CO+_forcing surely requires a flattening of the growth rate of fossil fuel emissions, which have grown 1.2%/year since 1975 (Fig. 4) .
Methane. The decline in the CH4 growth rate (Fig. 3B) caused the reduced growth rate of CH4. Sources and sinks of CH4 are not known to that accuracy (19, 45, 48) . The primary natural source of CH4 is microbial decay of organic matter under anoxic conditions in wetlands (45, 49) . Anthropogenic sources, which in sum may be twice as great as the natural source (45), include rice cultivation, domestic ruminants, bacterial decay in landfills and sewage, leakage during the mining of fossil fuels, leakage from natural gas pipelines, and biomass burning. Global warming could cause the natural wetland source to increase (49), but if warming causes a drying of wetlands, it might reduce the CH4 source.
Aerosols.Climate forcing by anthropogenic
aerosols may be the largest source of uncertainty about future climate change. The approximate gibba[balanc[ng of aerosol and COz forcings in the past (Fig. 1) cannot continue indefinitely. As long-lived CO2 accumulates, continued balancing requires a greater and greater aerosol load. Such a solution, we have argued (30), would be a Faustian bargain. Detrimental effects of aerosols, including acid rain and health impacts, will eventually limit the permissible atmospheric aerosol amount and thus expose latent greenhouse warming.
We do not even know the sign of the current trend of aerosol forcing, because such information would require knowledge of the trends of different aerosol compositions. Direct aerosol forcing depends on aerosol single scattering albedo (5, 50) and thus on the amount of absorbing constituents. Indirect aerosol forcing also depends on aerosol absorption, through th6_emi-direct effect on cloud cover (5) and the cloud particle single scattering albedo. Calculations for cloud particles with imbedded black carbon cores (51) suggest an effect on cloud albedo at distances up to 1,000 km from the carbon aerosol source.
An Alternative Scenario
Let us propose a climate forcing scenario for the next 50 years that adds little forcing (Fig. 5) , less than or about 1 W/m'-, and then ask whether the elements of the scenario are plausible. The next 50 years is the m0st difficult time to affect CO_, emissions, because of the inertia of global energy systems, as evidenced by Fig. 4 . The essence ot"thestrategy is to halt and even reverse the growth of non-CO_, GHGs and to reduce black carbon emissions. Such a strategy would mitigate an inevitable, even if slowing, growth of CO=. By midcentury improved energy efficiency and advanced technologies, perhaps including hydrogen-powered fuel cells, should allow policy options with reduced reliance on fossil fuels and, if necessary, CO_, sequestration. CarbonDioxide. This scenario calls for the mean CO: growth rate in the next 50 years to be about the same as in the past two decades. The additional forcing in 50 years is about 1 W,/m z for an average annual CO_, increment of 1.5 ppm.
Is such a CO2 growth rate plausible? We note that the CO2 growth rate increased little in the past 20 years, while much of the developing world had rapid economic growth. The United States also had strong growth with little emphasis on energy efficiency, indeed with increasing use of energy-inefficient sports utility vehicles. This fact suggests that there are opportunities to achieve reduced emissions consistent with strong economic growth. Limiting CO,_ growth to 75 ppm in the next 50 years probably requires a moderate decrease in CO: emission rates, as continuation of high terrestrial sequestration of CO: is uncertain.
In the near term (2000-2025) this scenario can be achieved by improved energy efficiency and a continued trend toward decarbonization of energy sources, e.g., increased use of gas instead of coal. Technologies for improved efficiency exist (ref. 52; available at www.natcap.org), and implementation can be driven by economic self-interest, but governments need to remove barriers that discourage buying of energy efficiency (53) . Business-as-usual scenarios often understate a long-term trend toward decarbonization of the energy supply (figure 8 in ref. 54 ), but the IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (9) includes a subset that is consistent with our CO: scenario.
In the longer term (2025-2050) attainment of a decreasing CO2 growth rate will require greater use of energy sources that produce little or no COz. Some renewable energy systems will be developed without concern for climate. But if such systems arc to play a substantial role by the second quarter of the century, it is important to foster research and development investments now in generic technologies at the interface between energy supply and end use--e.g., gas turbines, fuel cells, and photovoltalcs (43) .
Methane. Our scenario aims for a forcing of -0.2 W/m 2 for CH4 change in the next 50 years. This goal requires the reduction of anthropogenic CH_ sources by about 30%. Most CH4 sources are susceptible to reductions, many in ways that are otherwise beneficial (55, 56) . Reduction of CH4 would have the added benefit of increasing atmospheric OH and reducing tropospheric O3, a pollutant that is harmful to human health and agriculture (57).
The amount of CH4 produced by rice cultivation, perhaps the largest anthropogenic source, depends on cuhivar choice (58) . irrigation management (59) , and fertilization (61)). Mitigation strategies that maintain yields include intermittent irrigation (61). with the added advantage of redticing plant pests and mahtria-carrying mosquitoes. Ruminants offer substantial potential for emission reduction via dietary adjustments (62) , as the farmer's objective is to produce meat, milk, or power from the carbon in their feed, not CH4. CH4 losses from leaky natural gas distribution lines could be reduced, especially in the former Soviet Union, which is served by an old system that was built without financial incentives to reduce losses (63) . Similarly, CH4 escaping from landfills, coal mining and oil drilling sites, and anaerobic waste management lagoons can be reduced or captured, with economic benefits that partially or totally offset the costs (56) .
The economic benefits of CH4 capture probably are insufficient to bring about the 30% CH4 reduction that we suggest. But with additional incentives--e.g., as part of multigas strategies for limiting GHG climate forcing (64)--a 30% reduction in CH4 sources seems reasonable, in addition, it will be necessary to avoid new large CH4 sources. For example, in new pipeline distribution systems in Asia it will be important to use technology that minimizes losses.
The pollutant carbon monoxide (CO) contributes to increased CH4 and O3 through its effect on OH (65, 66) . A small downward trend in atmospheric CO has occurred in recent years, apparently as a result of pollution control in Western countries (67). More widespread use of advanced technologies that reduce CO emissions will help achieve CH4 and 03 reductions.
CFCs. The Montreal Protocol is aimed at reversing stratospheric ozone depletion.
A secondary benefit is reduction of climate forcing by the controlled gases. If production phase-out follows the current plan (40), the forcing by controlled gases will be about 0.15 W/m: less in 2050 than at present, primarily because of declining amounts of CFC-12 and CFC-II. Uncontrolled gases, some of which are substitutes for ozone-depleting chemicals, are likely to increase and cause a positive forcing of about that same magnitude in the next 50 years; the largest contributor to this forcing is HFC-134a (chapter 2 of ref. 4) .
Verification of the CFC phase-out requires continuing attention and atmospheric monitoring (42) , but overall the protocol has been a model of international environmental cooperation. The Protocol's Multilateral Fund recently approved $150 million for China and $82 million for India, the two largest remaining producers, for complete phase-out of their CFC production (40). The cost of the fund over a decade was about $1 billion (40).
At present the net change in climate forcing by these gases over the next 50 years is expected to be about zero. If the phase-out were extended to include additional gases, such as HFC-134a, and destruction of the accessible bank of CFC-12, a negative forcing change of -0.1 W/m 2 would seem possible. Business-as-usual scenarios have O3 continuing to increase in the future (4, 68) . Because O3 in the free troposphere can have a lifetime of weeks, tropospheric 03 is a global problem; e.g., emissions in Asia are projected to have a significant effect on air quality in the United States. High levels of Os have adverse health and ecosystem effects. Annual costs of the impacts on human health and crop productivity are each estimated to be on the order of $10 billion/year in the Unkcd States alone. Despite limited success of past attempts to reduce 03 (57), the human and ecological costs of this pollutant suggest that it should be a target for international cooperation in the next half-century.
Air (69) . There is a clear potential for cleaner energy sources and improved combustion technology to achieve an 03 reduction. Our scenario assumes that a small reduction of tropospheric 03 forcing, at least sufficient to balance the expected rebound of stratospheric O3, is plausible by 2050.
Aerosols. Aerosols, unlike GHGs, are not monitored to an accuracy defining their global forcing and its temporal change. It is often assumed (4) that aerosol forcing will become more negative in the future, which would be true if all aerosols were to increase in present proportions.
However, it is just as likely that aerosol forcing will become less negative. Such an outcome is possible, e.g., if nonabsorbing sulfates decrease because of regulations aimed at reducing acid rain.
Black carbon reduces aerosol albedo, causes a semidirect reduction of cloud cover, and reduces cloud particle albedo. All of these effects cause warming.
Conceivably a reduction of climate forcing by 0.5 W/m z or more could be obtained by reducing black carbon emissions from diesel fuel and coal. This reduction might become easier in the future, with more energy provided via electricity grids from power plants (43) . But a quantitative understanding of the role of absorbing aerosol in climate change is required to formulate reliable policy recommendations.
Aerosols have to be monitored globally, thus by satellite, because of their heterogeneity.
Measurements must yield precise aerosol optical depth, size distribution, and composition to define the direct forcing and provide data to analyze indirect effects. Such measurements are possible with precision multispectraI (UV to infrared) polarimetry, with each region viewed over a wide range of angles (70). These data should be accompanied by visible imaging for scene definition and infrared interferometry to yield a temperature profile and cloud properties. Simultaneous lidar data could provide precise vertical profiles of the aerosols.
Summary
Business-as-usual scenarios provide a useful warning about the potential for human-made climate change. Our analysis of climate forcings suggests, as a strategy to slow global warming, an alternative scenario focused on reducing non-COz GHGs and black carbon (soot) aerosols. Investments in technology to improve energy efficiency' and develop nonfossil energy sources are also needed to slow the growth of CO: emissions and expand future policy options.
A key feature of this strategy is its focus on air pollution, especially aerosols and tropospheric ozone, which have human health and ecological impacts. If the World Bank were to support investments in modern technology and air quality control in India and China, for example, the reductions in tropospheric ozone and black carbon would not only' improve local health and agricultural productivity but also benefit global climate and air quality. 
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